A High Court decision in a sexual abuse case against the Catholic Church has affirmed institutions are only vicariously liable for the acts or omissions of its employees.
In Bird v DP, The Plaintiff (DP) alleged he was sexually abused on two occasions by the now deceased Father Bryan Coffey (Coffey).
The abuse is alleged to have been perpetrated during pastoral visits by Coffey to the home of DP’s parents in 1971, at which time Coffey was an assistant parish priest not directly employed by the Diocese of Ballarat (Diocese).
DP commenced proceedings against the Diocese through its nominated defendant, the current Bishop of the Diocese, Paul Bird claiming damages for psychological injuries alleged to have been caused by Coffey.
DP claimed the Diocese was vicariously liable for Coffey's assaults notwithstanding the lack of a clear employment relationship between the Diocese and Coffey, and that the Diocese was negligent for not properly supervising and controlling Coffey.
At first instance, the Supreme Court of Victoria (Forrest J) held the Diocese was vicariously liable for Coffey's conduct because the relationship between the Diocese and Coffey was akin to an employment relationship. Forrest J held the Plaintiff had not established the Diocese was negligent.
On appeal, the Victorian Court of Appeal found the primary judge was correct in concluding Coffey's abuse occurred in circumstances rendering the Diocese vicariously liable.
Issue
The appeal to the High Court considered:
Held
The High Court unanimously allowed the appeal and ordered the Orders made by Forrest J be set aside, and for the proceeding to be dismissed with costs.
Vicarious Liability
The joint judgement of Gageler CJ, Gordon, Edelman, Steward and Beech-Jones JJ found:
Jagot J clearly rejected the submission the principles of vicarious liability should be extended, largely for two reasons:
In dissent, Gleeson J agreed with the majority's orders, but via a different reasoning, finding although the relationship between the Diocese and Coffey was one capable of attracting vicarious liability, the circumstances in which the abuse occurred, being that Coffey took advantage of his role to commit the abuse, could not be said to be in the course of Coffey's role as assistant parish priest.
Non-delegable duty
The Court unanimously declined to consider whether the Diocese owed a non-delegable duty of care to DP. As this contention was not raised before the appeal, the Court held consideration of the issue would irremediably prejudice the Diocese.
The Court recognised such a duty has previously arisen out of relationships of employer and employee, school and pupil; hospital and patient "where the nature of the relationship between the defendant and the other person to whom the duty is owed is one where the defendant has assumed particular responsibility to ensure that care is taken, rather than merely to take reasonable care." 5
The Court noted, whilst the issue of a personal or non-delegable duty was not entertained in the current case, as it may have prejudiced the Appellant given it should have been raised at trial (among other factors), future claimants may seek to raise this argument at the initial stages of trial given its relevance in similar abuse cases is yet to be determined.
However, the Court acknowledged the recent Royal Commission into Institutional Responses to Child Sexual Abuse may raise issues in presenting such an argument, given it had specifically recommended the recent addition of a statutory duty of care apply prospectively, and not retrospectively.6
Impact
The High Court has emphatically stated an employment relationship is a prerequisite to a finding of vicarious liability, and it is insufficient to merely have a relationship “akin to employment” as seen in other jurisdictions. This limits plaintiffs' ability to bring claims against institutions for the acts or omissions of others absent an employment relationship.
Whilst the High Court has not determined whether an institution such as the Diocese may owe a personal or non-delegable duty of care, the clear indication is the Court is unlikely to establish a new non-delegable duty of care retrospectively given the legislative establishment of a statutory duty of care with a reversed onus of proof prospectively from July 2017.
Notes
1 See [65] – [66].
2 [46].
3 See generally Colonial Mutual Life Assurance Society Ltd v Producers and Citizens Co-operative Assurance Co of Australia Ltd (1931) 46 CLR 41 ('Colonial Mutual Life').
4 [247].
5 [37].
6 Australia, Royal Commission into Institutional Responses to Child Sexual Abuse, Redress and Civil Litigation Report (2015), Ch 15.6, particularly recommendations 89-93 at 495.
Authors
Cameron Roberts | Partner | +61 3 9641 8696 | croberts@tglaw.com.au
Hannah Sowdon | Partner | +61 3 9641 8840 | hsowdon@tglaw.com.au
Nicholas Presta | Law Clerk